majority of items are less expensive in Australia than in the US, Australian prices are higher for a substantial number of products, particularly generic drugs. This article examines various policies affecting the pricing of generics in Australia. It is postulated that the main cause for higher prices for a substantial number of generic products is the lack of price competition. This results from government policy which ensures that a price reduction by one company is communicated immediately to all competitors in that market along with an invitation to match the reduced price. The dominant strategy for all suppliers is to only reduce their price in response to a reduction in price by a competitor. The result is a lack of differentiation in pricing across brands of a medicine on the Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits. The government could improve the structure of the generics market and encourage greater competition by ceasing to disclose competitor firms' offers to other competitors. The government could conduct pricing reviews of each generic product relatively infrequently (eg, only once annually or every 18 months). At the time of the pricing review, the government would request confidential offers on price for a generic from all players in the market. Brands should then all be listed under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) at the offered price. Prices offered by the individual supplier would apply until the next pricing review. The PBS would continue to subsidise up to the price of the lowest priced brand, with brand premiums applying to all brands priced higher than the benchmark price. Such an approach would provide opportunity for players in the market to capture market share by being the MOST PRESCRIPTION-ONLY medications dispensed to Australians by community pharmacies are included in the Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits, a list of medicines subsidised by the government. The Schedule is part of the wider Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) administered by the Department of Health and Ageing and Medicare Australia.
For each product subsidised under the PBS, the price that the manufacturer can charge is agreed between the manufacturer and the government. Based on this ex-manufacturer price, a dispensed priced, which allows for a specific wholesaler mark-up, a specific pharmacy mark-up and a specific dispensing fee is calculated and the final dispensed price is included in the Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits.
Pharmacies purchase PBS-listed drugs from the wholesaler or supplier, and claim the difference between the dispensed price and the patient copayment contribution from Medicare Australia. There are essentially two levels of patient copayment -one level for general patients and one for concessional patients. About 85% of prescriptions subsidised under the PBS are dispensed to concessional patients.
The major purchaser of pharmaceuticals in Australia is therefore, indirectly, the government. However, to the extent that they are required to pay copayments and brand premiums, patients are also purchasers of pharmaceuticals. In rela-Medicines Pricing tion to products available under the PBS that are available with more than one brand (eg, products for which generics are available), under the "brand premium" arrangements, the Commonwealth reimburses the price of a medicine only to the level of the lowest priced brand. Patients pay the difference (a brand price premium) for higher priced brands of medicines if they choose to take these instead of the benchmark (lowest-priced) product.
According to two commonly cited Productivity Commission reports, "International Pharmaceutical Price Differences" 1 and "Evaluation of the Pharmaceutical Industry Investment Program", 2 prices for pharmaceuticals listed on Australia' s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme are substantially lower than in other similar countries, particularly the US. It is also commonly believed that drug prices in the USA are the highest in the developed world. It is often claimed that one of the principal reasons for the lower prices observed in Australia is the bargaining power of the government relative to that of the suppliers. The bargaining power arises from the fact that most medicines, as discussed above, are paid for, at least to some extent, by the government, which is in effect, close to being a monopsony buyer.
For each financial year, the government publishes a report of expenditure on pharmaceuticals and prescription volumes in that year. 3 This report includes a list of the items that were of the highest cost to government and a list of items that were dispensed in the highest volumes. This paper reports the results of an analysis comparing Australian and US prices of drugs that are included in either the list of 100 highest government cost items or in the list of 100 highest volume items in the financial year ending 30 June 2007.
Results of price comparison
Australian prices for the 144 unique items included in either the list of 100 highest government cost items or in the list of 100 highest volume items (some items are included in both lists) were sourced from the May 2008 Schedule of Pharmaceutical Benefits. The base price, which represents the dispensed price for the lowest priced brand, for the item was used. Dispensed prices for the same items when supplied in the US were sought from drugstore.com, an online US pharmacy, in May 2008. US prices were available at drugstore.com for 102 of the 144 unique items. A number of products (eg, insulins, chemotherapeutic agents, hypnotics) are not available through the online pharmacy. As with the Australian prices, prices for the lowest-priced brand available were included in the analysis. To facilitate a price comparison, US prices were converted to Australian dollars using the exchange rate that applied in May 2008 (1A$ = 0.94US$).
Box 1 summarises the comparison of prices in Australia and US per dosing unit (ie, tablet, capsule, vial, etc) for each of the 102 items for which both Australian and US prices could be identified. The table is divided into items for which generics are available in Australia and those for which generics are not available. Of the 102 items, 50 (49%) of the items were for products for which no generic was available. Australian prices were similar or lower than US prices for 44 (88%) of these items. The remaining 52 (51%) items were products for which a generic brand is available in Australia. Australian prices were similar or lower for 33 (63%) of these items.
Although prices for originator branded products (including products still under patent) in Australia are, generally, lower than in the USA, there are a substantial number of instances where dispensed prices for generic products in Australia are higher than in the USA.
There are a number of issues in relation to the approach used to compare drug prices in Australia with those in the US that should be kept in mind in considering the results of the analysis. First, the conversion of US prices to Australian dollars was conducted at a time when the US dollar was at its weakest level in many years (1A$ = 0.94US$) and therefore the prices, expressed in Australian dollars, for drugs in the US could normally be higher than reported in this analysis. A sensitivity analysis was conducted assuming an exchange rate of 1A$ = 0.60US$. The number of generic products priced higher in * Price in Australia remains higher even if exchange rate of 1A$ = 0.60US$ (rather than 1A$ = 0.94US$) is applied. 1 Generic available in US but no generic available in Australia. 2 Inhaler not available in the US. US price corresponds to Advair Diskus 60 dose pack. 3 US price is for OTC supply. 4 Paracetamol is known as acetaminophen in the US; frusemide is known as furosemidein the US; salbutamol is known as albuterol in the US. One factor identified as contributing to high Australian prices for generics is the practice of discounts (through trading terms) offered by generic manufacturers to pharmacists, which are generally not reflected in the price paid by the consumer (the exceptions are discounting pharmacies such as Chemist Warehouse which pass on some of the discounts in an effort to win priceconscious consumers). This incentive for pharmacists to switch patients to the manufacturer' s particular generic brand has been one of the few means available to generics suppliers to influence market share. This has been a successful strategy because, although prescribers determine the medication a patient will take by writing a prescription, pharmacists have an influence on the actual brand dispensed (unless the doctor specifically endorses the prescription with a direction stating that brand substitution is not permitted).
Government policy responses to high generics prices
The government has introduced a number of measures to address the issue of high prices for generic medicines and the discounting of generics to pharmacies.
In 2005, the government introduced a requirement for the first generic version listed of an existing PBS medicine to be automatically subjected to a reduction of at least 12.5 per cent in the government benchmark price.
Further price reductions for generic products will apply as a result of other changes introduced in August 2007. These changes are described in detail by de Boer and Searles in this issue (pages 176 and 186), and in other sources. 7, 8 In summary, these changes involve a classification of medications on the PBS into two different formularies: one classification (F1) essentially applies to single brand medicines excluding single brand medicines which are interchangeable at the patient level with multiple brand medicines, and the other (F2) to medicines where generics or interchangeable alternatives are available. Medicines in the following groups have been recommended by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) and determined by the Minister to be interchangeable at the patient level: ACE inhibitors, angiotensin II receptor antagonists, calcium channel blockers, H2 receptor antagonists, proton pump inhibitors and the HMG coenzyme A reductase inhibitors (pravastatin & simvastatin only).
For medicines included in the F2 classification, further discounts are mandated. The extent of discount to be applied is related to whether the Medicines Pricing medicine was heavily (у 25%) discounted to pharmacy as at 1 October 2006. For drugs that were not heavily discounted, staged price reductions of 2% per year for 3 years were to apply commencing on 1 August 2008. For drugs that were heavily discounted, a price reduction of 25% was to be applied. In addition, suppliers listing new brands of a medicine will be required to disclose the actual market price as a condition of listing. Pricing based on disclosure will then continue on an annual cycle.
Compensation is provided for pharmacists and wholesalers for loss of income from statutory F2 price reductions.
This takes the form of: ■ An incentive of $1.50 for pharmacists to dispense a substitutable, premium-free medicine. This applies only to PBS subsidised medicines. Under-copayment medicines and private scripts are not eligible for this payment.
■ An incentive of 40c for each prescription processed using PBS Online; and ■ Increases in pharmacy mark ups and dispensing fees. Additional funding of $69 million over three years will be added to the Community Services Obligation (CSO) Funding Pool to compensate wholesalers for the impact on the wholesale margin resulting from the new pricing arrangements.
Issues in relation to these policy measures include: ■ The mandatory price reductions go some way in addressing the issue of high priced generics, but are unlikely to generate the maximum savings possible, which would be those that would occur if there was a move to a more competitive environment. Searles et al, 9 the creation of the F1 classification will insulate high priced single brand (patented) F1 drugs from the reference pricing that applied under previous PBS processes. Once a new drug is listed as an F1 drug, its price will not be linked to the price of any similar drug in the F2 classification. F1 drugs are considered not interchangeable at the individual patient level with drugs that have multiple brands, so the manufacturers may be able to retain their original PBS price until the listing of a bioequivalent brand satisfies the new standards for a shift to the F2 classification. Reductions in F2 drug prices will not affect F1 prices, even where the therapeutic effect of an F2 medicine is similar though not necessarily "interchangeable at the individual patient level". Thus, the creation of the F1 category is likely to, over time, result in higher prices for some patented drugs than would have been the case under previous PBS arrangements. ■ To apply blanket cuts across the board is to take a blunt axe to prices where a surgeon' s scalpel may be more appropriate. As shown in Box 1, not all generics are priced at inappropriately high levels and the policy may be inappropriately harsh on these products and inappropriately soft on other products. Some companies may be forced to charge prices that might ultimately put their viability at risk.
Economic theory and the generics market in Australia
In this section, policies influencing the pricing of generic drugs are discussed and causes of higher prices, compared with those in the US, are identified. New drugs are initially available with patent protection. This protects the manufacturer' s investment in research, development, marketing and promotion. The originator firm has the sole right to sell the medicine while the patent is in effect. Once the patent for that medicine has expired, other firms are all free to market their own brand of that medicine.
Calculation of potential savings
Firms producing generic medicines do not have to match the investment of companies developing new drugs and should therefore be able to pass on their lower costs in the form of lower consumer prices. The presence of more companies and products in the market would be expected to increase competition and lower prices for generics compared with originator brands. However, in Australia there is typically little difference between the price of the originator brands and the generic brands. Furthermore, there is typically little or no difference between the prices of different brands of generics.
As an example, consider the market for simvastatin 40mg tablets, a cholesterol-lowering agent, which is included in the top 5 items in both the list of highest government cost items and the list of highest volume items. As shown in Box 3, potential savings of at least $60 million could be generated for the government if the price for this item were reduced to the price in the US. Merck Sharp & Dohme was the original producer of simvastatin in Australia and Zocor® is the originator brand of this product. Another brand of simvastatin, Lipex®, was also originally available. 10 All but two brands (the originator product and the licensed pseudo-generic -see further below) of simvastatin 40mg were priced at $54.65. The price for the originator brands, Zocor® and Lipex®, was $55.99. This lack of price differentiation across the market for a single item and the small difference between the price of the originator brand and the generic brand is typical for the majority of medicines where patents have expired and generic alternatives are available. Box 5 shows the change in the PBS dispensed price for simvastatin 40mg over time. The price shown is the benchmark price, the price of the lowest priced brand available. From this figure, it can be seen that the first substantial price drop occurred in August 2005, when the patent on simvastatin expired and generic brands of simvastatin became available on the PBS. The price reduction occurred primarily as a result of the mandatory 12.5% price cut, as explained above.
Availability of simvastatin 40mg on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule at 1 May 2008
The second significant price reduction resulted from the entry of the Indian-based firm Ranbaxy to the Australian generics market. It is likely that Ranbaxy's aggressive pricing strategy was designed to result in the capture of significant market share. However, for reasons discussed below, it is unlikely that this result will have been achieved.
The different brands of a medicine could be considered perfect substitutes. If the market for a medicine was a typical competitive market, the price of a particular brand of a generic medicine would have direct consequences for the volume of that product demanded and supplied. As the price for a particular brand of the medicine decreases, one would expect the market share for that particular brand to increase.
As discussed above, the major purchaser of pharmaceuticals in the Australian market is the government. However, to the extent that they are required to pay copayments and brand premiums, patients are also purchasers of pharmaceuticals. Also, as discussed already, under the brand premium arrangements, the Commonwealth reimburses the price of a medicine only to the level of the lowest priced brand. Patients pay the difference (a brand price premium) for higher priced brands of medicines if they choose these instead of the benchmark product. The fact that patients themselves are faced with an economic incentive to choose the lowest priced brand should ensure competition among the suppliers. However, as illustrated by Box 5, with the exception of the lowering of the price of simvastatin that accompanied the introduction of the Ranbaxy brand, there is very limited price competition. Ranbaxy' s aggressive pricing strategy could signal a lack of understanding of the Australian generics market and could be ill-advised from a business perspective as the strategy was unlikely to result in significant capture of market share. Game theory is used to explain why this is the case. Firms marketing generic medicines in Australia can be considered to be presented with circumstances akin to what, in game theory, is called an "iterative prisoner' s dilemma".
The prisoner' s dilemma was illustrated by Poundstone (1993) 11 using the following hypothetical situation: two members of a criminal gang are arrested under the suspicion of having committed a crime together. However, the police do not have sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction on the principal charge. The two prisoners are isolated from each other, and the police visit each of them and offer the following deal: if evidence is offered against the other prisoner and the other prisoner remains silent, he is freed and the other prisoner will be given three years in prison on the main charge. If both stay silent, both will get only a year in prison on a lesser charge because of lack of proof on the main charge. If both confess, each get charged and receive a two-year sentence. The game is summarised in Box 6. The prisoners are given some time to think this over but in no case may either prisoner learn what the other has decided until they have both made irrevocable decisions. Each prisoner is informed that the other suspect is being offered the very same deal.
Overall and on balance, both prisoners would be better off cooperating with each other and remaining silent. However, if each prisoner is concerned only with his own welfare and minimising his own prison sentence, each of the prisoners has an individual incentive to offer evidence against the other suspect. Each prisoner can reason as follows: "Suppose I testify and the other prisoner doesn't. Then I get off scot-free (rather than spending a year in jail). Suppose I testify and the other prisoner does too. Then I get two years (rather than three). Either way I'm better off giving evidence." Offering evidence against the other suspect is a dominant strategy for both players in this game. No matter what the other player' s choice is, each prisoner can reduce his sentence by confessing. Unfortunately for the prisoners, this leads to a poor outcome where both offer evidence against each other and both are given severe sentences. The conflict between the collective interest and self-interest is the core of the prisoner' s dilemma.
When the prisoner' s dilemma game is played repeatedly, or iteratively, players have an opportunity to "punish" each other for previous noncooperation. Cooperation is therefore more likely to arise as an equilibrium outcome. The incentive to offer evidence may then be overcome by the threat of punishment, leading to the possibility of a superior, cooperative outcome.
In the case of the firms marketing generic medicines in Australia, the game could be considered to be structured as shown in Box 7. The game here is repeated as firms continuously compete in the market for a specific generic product over an infinite horizon. Also, the same firms tend to compete each time a patent on 6 Classic prisoner's dilemma another product expires. This could partly explain the cooperative outcomes that can be observed in reality. However, there is an important deviation from the classic prisoner' s dilemma proposed here as the primary cause of cooperative outcomes in the Australian generic medicines market -the degree of information provided to players in the game. Where in the classic prisoner' s dilemma the police do not inform suspects of each others' choice, the government openly provides information on action taken by competitors in the market: when a manufacturer offers the government a lower price for one particular brand of medicine, the government immediately affords all other manufacturers of that medicine the opportunity to match that price. The government thereby removes the risk of the worst possible outcome to players in the market. Thus, there is little real chance that one competitor will lower its price to obtain greater market share with other competitors in the market not reducing their price at the same time. The dominant strategy for all manufacturers of a generic medicine is to only reduce their price in response to a reduction in price by another competitor. There is no incentive to be the first to offer a reduced price. Indeed, there is a strong incentive for manufacturers to cooperate with each other by not offering reduced prices at all.
Alternate approach -competitive tendering
Some commentators (eg, Searles et al 9 ) have suggested that competitive tendering, where arrangements for the supply of one or more subsidised brands of a medicine are made after consideration of tenders to supply, should be adopted, and note that this approach has been successful in other countries such as New Zealand. However, the structure of the drug purchasing system, and the overall role of the pharmaceutical industry in the economy, may be substantially different in these countries.
One of the objectives of Australia' s National Medicines Policy 12 is to sustain a responsible and viable medicines industry in Australia. The government considers that industry policy and health policy should be coordinated to provide a consistent and supportive industry environment, and appropriate returns on research and development, manufacturing, and supply of medicines. As competitive tendering creates barriers to mar- Medicines Pricing ket access (and results in the "locking out" or exclusion of firms in the short term, which could have consequences for viability of the firm), such a policy may not be consistent with Australia' s National Medicines Policy. Furthermore, the reliance on one or two suppliers for a generic product increases risks of disruptions in supply due to unforeseen circumstances. Another issue that could arise if a system of competitive tendering were adopted relates to the availability of "pseudo-generics" in the Australian market. Pseudo-generics are generic products that are made by brand-name producers copying their own brand-name drugs. The problem could also occur as a result of close relationships between a generics supplier and the company that manufactured the originator brand as a result of crosslicensing agreements and the acquisition of generics suppliers by large multinational companies. Hollis 13 notes that pseudo-generic drugs are often treated as though they were independent generics, and this is the case in Australia. The company associated with the originator brand will always be able to release its pseudo-generic before other generics enter the market. This weakens the incentive for generic firms to invent around the brand-name firm' s patents, since the pseudo-generic can always get to market first.
A third problem also has the potential to arise. Where the company that successfully tenders to be the supplier of a generic product is owned by the company producing the originator brand, there will be an economic incentive for the manufacturer to under-supply the generic product to the extent that is possible as it forces consumers to switch to the higher priced originator brand.
Alternative -alter structure of the market to encourage competition
An alternative approach to remedying the problem of pricing cooperation is to change the structure of the generics market to discourage such cooperation. Besanko et al 14 explain how price cooperation is harder to achieve under some market structures than others. Four market structure conditions that can affect the attainment of cooperative pricing are: ■ Market concentration -as the number of firms increases, the likelihood of cooperative pricing decreases. This is because firms that undercut other firms have more to gain (in terms of increase in relative market share) compared with when there are fewer firms in the market. ■ Structural conditions that affect reaction speeds and detection lags -the speed with which firms can react to their rivals' pricing moves affects the sustainability of cooperative pricing. The greater the time period before a firm can react to competitors' price cuts, the lower the likelihood of cooperative pricing. Long lags between price cuts and competitor response also reduce the effectiveness of retaliatory price cuts aimed at punishing price cutting firms. ■ Firm asymmetries -where firms are not identical in terms of cost structures or capacity, cooperative pricing becomes less likely. Smaller firms benefit less from cooperative pricing and have greater incentives to price competitively. Firms with lower marginal costs are also more likely to price competitively. ■ Multimarket contact -firms that compete with each other in more than one market are more likely to price cooperatively. The government is limited in its ability to influence three of these four conditions to manipulate the structure of the generics market. However, it is able to influence reaction speeds and detection lag conditions. As discussed above, firms marketing generics in Australia are able to respond instantly to competitors' price cuts as the government informs them directly of the price cut to be applied by competitors. The structure of the market could be improved (to encourage greater competition) by cessation of the government practice of disclosing of competitor firms' offers to other competitors. The government could conduct pricing reviews relatively infrequently (eg, only once annually or every 18 months). At the time of the pricing review for a generic product, the government would request confidential offers on price for that product from each player in the market. Brands should then all be listed on the PBS at the price offered. Prices offered would apply until the next pricing review. The PBS would continue to subsidise up to the price of the lowest priced brand, with brand premiums applying to all brands priced higher than the benchmark price.
Such an approach would provide opportunity for players in the market to capture market share by being the lowest priced brand in a market. This would encourage competition in the market and result in lower prices for generics. In addition, this approach removes incentives for generic manufacturers to attempt to gain market share by offering discounts to pharmacies rather than directly to patients.
A potential issue that might be raised in response to this proposal is that patients may need to switch brands every 12-18 months if they wish to always use the base-priced brand. However, this problem is not unique to this model. The approach where generics manufacturers offer sizeable discounts through pharmacy trading terms to switch patients to particular generic brands could also result in relatively frequent changes in the generic brand given to patients.
The industry may claim that there is limited scope under this option for fine tuning of decisions if the manufacturer sets the price incorrectly. The potential impact on the business could be large and the ongoing viability of the manufacturer could be threatened. However, walking the tightrope of offering a product at the "right" price that ensures market share without putting manufacturers' viability at risk is a fact of life in other competitive markets. Unlike the government, manufacturers have information about the cost of producing a product and should therefore be able to calculate the best price it can offer without putting the company' s viability at risk. Most generics manufacturers produce more than one product and therefore an error (pricing too high) in one product market may mean a loss of market share for that item, but the manufacturer can continue to compete in other product markets. If the manufacturer finds that their prices are always higher than competitors' prices then that manufacturer would have the incentive to examine their processes for opportunities to improve efficiency.
Box 3 provides estimates of potential savings to the government if dispensed prices for generic items in Box 1 that cost more in Australia than the US were reduced to US levels. This table demonstrates that savings of up to $305 million could be achieved. Sensitivity analysis that included an exchange rate of 1A$ = 0.60US$ (instead of 1A$ = 0.94US$) demonstrates that savings up to $112 million could be achieved.
Conclusion
The prices of several generic products, including high-volume drugs, are substantially higher in Australia than in the USA. The response by the Australian government to the problem of high generics prices paid through the PBS has been to indiscriminately mandate price reductions. This policy is inappropriately harsh on products that are already competitively priced and is inappropriately gentle on some other products such as those that are priced at more than double the price in the US. That higher prices are paid for a substantial number of generic products is partially explained by the government policy of immediately communicating price changes proposed by one competitor to all other competitors, along with an invitation to match the offered price. Using game theory, it is postulated that this policy contributes to the suppression of competition. Instead of mandating indiscriminate price reductions, the government could improve the structure of the generics market and encourage greater competition by ceasing to disclose competitor firms' offers to other competitors and concurrently introducing periodic price reviews for each product to reduce the speed with which players in the market can react to changes in price by a competitor. The fostering of a more competitive generics market is likely to yield substantial savings to the PBS.
